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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) (i) as this is

an appeal from a

final judgment and order in a civil matter of the Third District
Court of

Salt Lake County/ State of Utah.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff brought an action against the defendant law firm
for negligence in representing

its interests in the sale of

certain manufacturing equipment.
A jury

trial was held

beginning December

1, 1987 and

concluding December 9, 1987.
The

jury returned

a verdict for the defendant and the

plaintiff appeals to recover its damages and for a new trial.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the jury's finding that the plaintiff was 50%

negligent was proper.
2.

Whether the jury was justified in reducing the damages

from that stated in the evidence where no evidence of mitigation
or reduction was offered by the defense.
3.

Whether the exclusion of evidence of what the plaintiff

could have done had it been properly advised of its rights under
paragraph 6.03 of the contract was prejudicial error.
4.

Whether the exclusion of prior statements of a witness

who testified at the trial was prejudicial error.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant law
firm to recover damages for negligence of its attorney's in
representing its interest in the sale of certain manufacturing
equipment to a firm known as Untied Fiberglass.
The basis of the plaintiff's claim was that the defendant
failed to file the appropriate financing statements to perfect
its security in the accounts receivable of United Fiberglass, and
that the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff that its rights
to retake possession of the equipment in the event of United
Fiberglass's default was subject to a lien of Sovran Bank, which
took a secured position in the equipment as collateral for the
purchase price.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appeals on the
grounds set forth below.
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE APPEAL
In 1982 plaintiff
insulation.

(RT. Vol.

was a manufacturer

of

fiberglass

1 of 6 days, pages 27-32, and Vol. 3 of 6

days, pages 29 and 35).
Ivan Radman was the president of plaintiff and the person
who represented the the plaintiff in the transactions giving rise
to matters now pending before the court. (RT. Vol.

1 of 6 days,

page 22, and Vol. 3 of 6 days, page 35).
Neither

the plaintiff

nor

Ivan Radman

had any prior

experience

in buying or selling equipment where part of the

purchase price was deferred and payment secured by accounts
receivable of the purchaser.

(RT. Vol.

1 of 6 days, pages 25-

26, 30, 34-35, 37-38, and Vol. 3 of 6 days, pages 43-45 and 114115) .
Plaintiff contracted in January 1983 for the sale of certain
fiberglass manufacturing equipment to a Virginia Firm known as
United Fiberglass (OR. Exhibit 11; and RT. Vol.

1 of 6 days,

pages 39-48, 72, 82).
Plaintiff employed defendants1 attorneys to represent and
protect its interests in the negotiations and closing of the
contract

(Vol.

1 of 6 days, pages 51-59, and 66; Vol 2 of 6

days, pages 3; Vol. 3 of 6 days pages 134, 139, 140-141; and Vol.
5 of 6 days, pages 133-134).
The contract provided for deferred payments of a portion of
the purchase price, which payments were to be secured by the
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass (Exhibit 11, paragraph
2.03; RT. Vol.

1 of 6 days, page 86-87).

The defendant attorneys failed to inform or advise the
plaintiff or its agents of the need to file financing statments
in order

to perfect its security interests

in the accounts

receivable of United Fiberglass (OR. Exhibit 83; RT. Vol. 2 of 6
days, pages 12-15; Vol. 3 of 6 days, pages 161-162; and Vol. 4 of
6 days, pages 34-37, 75-76, and 79).
Defendant attorneys, knowing of the need to file financing
statements, did not cause such statement to be filed covering the

accounts receivable of United Fiberglass (RT. Vol.

1 of 6 days,

page 34; Vol. 3 of 6 days, pages 99-100, 156-165; and Vol. 4 of 6
days, pages 29-31, and 140).
The contract provided, further, at paragraph 6.03, that in
the event of default by United Fiberglass, the plaintiff would
have the right to retake possession of its equipment

( OR.

Exhibit 11, paragraph 6.03; and RT. Vol. 2 of 6 days, pages 4-8).
Although the evidence was in dispute whether Mr. Radman was
informed that the plaintiff's right to take back the equipment
was subject to the liens of Sovran Bank, the Court excluded
testimony of R. Bailie which would have supported the plaintiff's
contention that the plaintiff was not so informed (RT. Vol. 4 of
6 days, pages 32, 51, and Vol. 5 of 6 days, pages 63-64).
The only other

evidence of whether

the plaintiff was

informed that its rights to take back the equipment under

6.03

were subject to the liens of Sovran Bank, was the self serving
statements of Dwight Williams (RT. Vol. 4 of 6 days, pages 85-87,
101-105) .
Further, the Court refused to allow Mr. Radman to testify
regarding what could have been done to modify the agreement to
protect the equipment had he known that the plaintiff's rights to
retake possession were subject to the liens of the bank (RT. Vol.
3 of 6 days, pages 27-28).
During the period between September 1984 and February 1985,
the accounts receivabtle of United Fiberglass which were not
subject to a prior lien by Sovran Bank ranged between $190,000.00

and $240,000.00 (OR. Exhibits 116 and 117; RT. Vol. 5 of 6 days,
pages 22-28 and 54).
In response to the special verdict, the Jury found that the
defendant had a duty to perfect a security interest in the
accounts

receivable

on behalf of the plaintiff; that the

defendant breached that duty to the plaintiff; and that the
plaintiff suffered damages in the sum of $84,000.00 (RT. Vol.

6

of 6 days, page 79-82).
The Jury found, also,

that the plaintiff was 50% negligent

in the damages thus assessed (RT. Vol. 6 of 6 days, page 81).
Further, the Jury found that the defendant had a duty to
advise the plaintiff that it rights under paragraph 6.03 of the
contract were subject to the liens of Sovran Bank; and that the
defendants had not breached that duty (RT. Vol. 6 of 6 days, page
81 and 82) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Jury should not have found the plaintiff 50% negligent
with regard to the failure to file the financing statements over
the accounts receivable of United Fiberglass.

The Courts cited

have consistently held that a client may not be contributor ily
negligent with regard to matters entrusted to their attorney,
where there are not facts of interference or failure to follow
instructions on behalf of the client.
The breach

of duty

in failing

to file the financing

statements was so clear that as a matter of law the attorney was
negligent, and the plaintiff did nothing to interfere with or

contribute to the fact that the financing statements were not
filed.
The defense

did not put on any evidence to reduce or

mitigate the damages alleged by the plaintiff.

Those damages

were measured by the level of accounts receivable during the
period between September 1984 and February 1985.

Having found

that the defendants negligent for failing to file the financing
statements, the Jury should have found that the evidence was
uncontradicted that the plaintiff was entitled to damages in the
sum of approximately $200,000.00.
The trial court erred in excluding the statements of R.
Bailie with regard to conversations with, and affidavits given to
the plaintiff, qualifying his deposition testimony regarding the
plaintiff's knowledge of its rights under 6.03.
evidence

in this regard

testimony of Bailie

The strongest

in favor of the defendant was the

and Williams.

Because

Bailie

was a

disinterested witness, his testimony was critical the plaintiff,
and its exclusion was detrimental.
The trial court erred in excluding evidence of what the
plaintiff could have done had it known the true import of 6.03.
An essential element of the plaintiff cause of action was how it
would have benefited had the attorney advised it properly.

Since

this element was excluded by the Court, the plaintiff was denied
a full hearing on the merits and should be given a new trial in
this regard.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Jury should not have found the plaintiff 50% negligent
with regard to the failure to file financing statements over the
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass.
Utah's Comparative Negligence statute, UCA 78-27-38, states
as follows:

"The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not

bar recovery by that person.

He may recover from any defendant

or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own.

However no

defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant."
Where the defense rests on contributory negligence, the
attorney has the burden of proving
contributory negligence.

every element of such

Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P2d 1238; R.

Mallen and V. Levit, Legal Malpratice 416, (2nd Ed. 1981).
The courts have usually refused to impose upon the client
the duty of supervising the very subject matter of the retention.
Legal Malpractice, Section 172, p. 222.
It has been held that the failure to observe statutory
requirements in the preparation of a security document, the
failure to record it in the proper county, the failure to record
it a all, or the failure to inform the client of the necessity
for recordation constitute acts of negligence sufficient to hold
an attorney liable to his client, if the negligence can be proved
and damages shown to be the result of such acts or omissions.

Theobald v. Byers, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864; 87 ALR 2nd 991.
Such omissions by the attorney
negligence as a matter of law.

have been

found

to be

Practical Offset v. Davis, 404

N.E.2d 516; Degen v. Steinbeck, 142 N.E2d 328; George v. Caton,
600 P2d 822; Kane, Kane & Kritzer v. Altager, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534.
In the Utah case, Acculog, Inc. v. Keith Peterson, 692 P2d
728, the Supreme Court discussed the elements of comparative
negligence, and the Court stated: "The ultimate

facts in a

comparative negligence case embrace only negligence, causation
and the percentages of negligence attributed to the plaintiff and
defendant. (Citations omitted). A plaintiff cannot be held to be
contributorily

negligent unless his negligence

is causally

connected to the plaintiff's injury."
In Acculog the Court explains, a page 730,

that: "We are

not concerned in comparative negligence law with the cause of the
damages, but with the cause of the injury instead.
"The term injury is sometimes used in the sense of damage,
as including the type of harm or loss for which compensation is
sought

and has been defined as damage resulting from an unlawful

act; but

in strict

legal significance, there is, properly

speaking, a material distinction between the two terms, in that
injury means something done against the right of the party,
producing damage, whereas damage is the harm, detriment, or loss
sustained by reason of the injury."
In that case, the Court determined that the cause of a truck
fire was the injury and the loss to the truck and its contents
11

was the damage.

And that/ although the jury had found that the

plaintiff was contributorily negligent/ the Court set aside the
verdict on the grounds that there was no evidence that the
plaintiff had in any way caused the truck fire.
So it is in the case now before the Court.

The plaintiff

did nothing to prevent or hinder the attorney from filing the
financing statements to perfect its secured interests in the
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass.

The evidence is

uncontroverted that the attorneys were aware of the need to file
the financing statements; that the plaintiff was not aware of
such a need; that the plaintiff was relying upon the security for
the payment of the deferred purchase price; that the attorneys
did not advise the plaintiff of the need to file the statements;
and that/ in fact/ no statements were ever filed.
Therefore, there being no evidence that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent in the failure to file the financing
statements, the jury verdict in that regard should be set aside.
II.
The d e f e n s e

did

not

put

on any e v i d e n c e

m i t i g a t e the damages a l l e g e d by the
It

is

uncontradicted

to

in

default/

plaintiff's

the

in the record

security

accounts
would

have

or

plaintiff.
t h a t during the

between September 1984 and February 1985/ while United
was

reduce

receivable
applied

was

over

period

fiberglass
which

the

approximately

$190/000.00 to $240/000.00.
It

is

evident

from the d i s p a r i t y between the s t a t e of

the

evidence and the finding of the jury that the jury's decision in
assessing damages was prejudiced by its assessment of liability.
Therefore, the finding limiting the plaintiff to $84,000.00
in damages should be set aside also.
III.
The trial court excluded

the affidavit of R. Bailie and

evidence of his conversations with the plaintiff after

his

deposition.
At

trial

the defense

relied

upon both

the oral and

deposition testimony of R. Bailie as evidence that the plaintiff
knew that its rights under paragraph 6.03 were subject to the
lien of Sovran Bank (RT. Vol. 5 of 6 days, pages 50-51 and 6364) .
Subsequent to the deposition and prior to trial, R. Bailie
had given an affidavit to the plaintiff further explaining his
testimony which supported the plaintiff's position that it did
not know that its rights under 6.03 were subject to the liens of
the bank.

However, when the plaintiff attempted to introduce

such testimony and affidavit the Court excluded

it.

This was

error.
Rule 613, Utah Rules of Evidence, permits the use of such
testimony

and affidavits

as long

as the witness

has the

opportunity to explain or deny the statement and the opposing
party has the opportunity to cross examine the witness.
Mr. Bailie was present at trial; he would have been able to
explain or deny the statements; and he was subject

to the

examination

of the defense counsel.

Therefore, his statements

should have been admitted.
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, states in pertinent part
that:

"Error may not predicated upon a ruling which admits or

excludes evidence unless a substantial right is affected, and
(1) ...

(2) Offer of Proof.

In case the ruling is one excluding

evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the
court by offer or was apparent from the context within which the
question was asked."
The defense relied principally upon two witnesses for its
defense that the plaintiff had notice of its rights under 6.03.
One of those witnesses was Mr. Bailie and the other was Dwight
Williams.

Since Mr. Bailie was a disinterested witness, the

exclusion

of his testimony

favorable to the plaintiff was

prejudice, and the jury's finding that the plaintiff had been
advised of his rights under 6.03 should be set aside.
IV.
An essential element of the plaintiff's case was its burden
to show how it would have benefited had it known its rights under
paragraph 6.03.
Where the error is an omission, the test of causation is:
had the attorney performed the act, would the plaintiff have
benefited.

Dunn v. Mckay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman,

584 p2d.

894, 895 (Utah 1978); Legal Malpractice, Section 102.
During the course of the trial, when the plaintiff attempted

to show how the agreement could have been changed had it known
that its rights under 6.03 were subject to the lien of Sovran
Bank, the Court sustained the objection of the defense, thus
precluding the plaintiff from a full and fair hearing on the
merits of its claim.
The court's exclusion of evidence of what the plaintiff
could have done had it known the true nature of its rights under
paragraph

6.03

was prejudicial

in that the plaintiff was

precluded from presenting a full and complete case.
Therefore, the verdict in this regard should be set aside
and the matter remanded for an new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the jury verdict finding the
plaintiff 50% negligent was not supported by the evidence and was
improper as a matter of law and should be set aside and new trial
ordered.
The jury's reduction of the damages from that shown by the
evidence was arbitrary and capricious and should be set aside and
a new trial ordered.
The Courts exlcusion of evidence regarding how the plaintiff
would have modified the agreement had it known that its rights
under paragraph 6.03 were subject to the liens of Sovran Bank was
prejudicial error, and the verdict in that regard should be set
aside and a new trial ordered on that issue.
Further, the Courts exlcusion of the testimony of the R.
Bailie and his affidavit given to the plaintiff subsequent to his
15

deposition was prejudicial to the plaintiff's case entitling the
plaintiff to an new trial.
Dated:

July 5, 1988.

Respectfully Submitted,

Joseph R. Fox
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

